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Abstract
We consider a model with labor market frictions and monopolistic
competition in the goods market. We introduce proportional income
taxation and unemployment beneﬁts with Government balanced bud-
get constraint. We evaluate the eﬀects of both more competition and
higher unemployment beneﬁts. We show that more competition has
a positive eﬀect on employment and the Government budget. Higher
unemployment beneﬁts can be ﬁnanced both by higher tax rate and
by increasing competition. Liberalization policies could permit: a) to
avoid an increase in unemployment if we allow some rise in the tax
rate; b) to decrease unemployment keeping the tax rate unchanged.
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11 Introduction
The Nineties were characterized by a number of labor market reforms in
the major European countries. The introduction of "non-standard" labor
contracts allowed for easier access to the labor market for some categories of
workers (mainly young people looking for ﬁrst job), but it also determined
an increase in the ﬂows in and out of unemployment.
With respect to some EU countries this process was not accompanied by
the introduction of unemployment beneﬁts programmes able to give support
to the unemployed workers in the transition period from one job to another.
This is also due to the diﬃculty of drawing upon resources to ﬁnance these
kinds of programs given the public budget constraints imposed by the EMU.
At the same time, the last few years have seen the emergence of a new
political determination to introduce measures to increase the degree of com-
petition in some strategic sectors, such as the services and public utilities. In
particular, pushes towards liberalizations policies come both from European
Commission and from consumers.
Such is the context of the subject matter of this paper which aims to
study the interactions between wage taxation, unemployment beneﬁts, and
product market liberalization policies, in a theoretical framework where the
labor market is characterized by search frictions (Pissarides (2000)) and
there is monopolistic competition in the goods market (Dixit and Stiglitz
(1977)).
The issue is important since greater competition can help to free re-
sources which may serve to reduce taxation or to channel the public surplus
generated by liberalization towards some forms of social expenditure.
By the term competition policy we mean the set of measures that aim to
widen the area of the market economy, with interventions in diﬀerent areas:
2a) liberalization and simpliﬁcation, in order to remove the public constraints
on the free behavior of economic agents; b) privatization, to eliminate the
constraints of implicit control over entrepreneurship by the Government;
c) regulation to introduce new rules, mainly market-oriented; d) speciﬁc
guarantee interventions, within application of antitrust legislation.
There are several empirical studies that show the positive eﬀects of a
higher level of competition. First of all, it is reasonable to suppose that
greater competition determines a positive eﬀect on per capita income, which
can be considered a convenient measure of welfare. Nicoletti and Scar-
petta (2003) have pointed out the positive eﬀect on productivity, through
an improvement in the allocation of resources and as an incentive for man-
agers to increase productive eﬃciency. Positive eﬀects of competition on
innovation and on the diﬀusion of technology have been underlined by
Aghion, Harris, Howitt, and Vickers (2001) and Gust and Marquez (2002).
Alesina, Ardagna, Nicoletti, Schiantarelli, and Nicoletti (2003) have empir-
ically shown how greater competition can have a positive eﬀect on the level
of ﬁxed investments, at least for certain types of industries.
Moreover, there are many contributions that show how a higher level of
competition (especially with the removal of entry barriers) can have posi-
tive eﬀects on employment1, from both the theoretical (Pissarides (2001);
Saint-Paul (2002); Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003); Ebell and Haefke (2003);
Fiori, Nicoletti, Scarpetta, and Schiantarelli (2007)) and the empirical point
of view (Boeri, Nicoletti, and Scarpetta (2000); Nicoletti, Haﬀner, Nickell,
Scarpetta, and Zoega (2001); Kugler and Pica (2006); Nicoletti and Scar-
petta (2004)). In fact, greater competition reduces the ﬁrms’ rents in the
1With the exception of Amable and Gatti (2004), that, in a eﬃciency wage framework,
show the negative eﬀects of more competition on job security (by the reduction of hiring
and separation rate), and the consequential real wages increase to the point that more
competition may produce employment losses rather than gains.
3goods market, determining an increase of the production activity and there-
fore of employment. Moreover, the more competitive the product market is,
the more negative will a rigid labor market prove for the growth rate of the
economy.
The empirical evidence suggests a positive relationship between reforms
in the goods market and reforms in the labor market in the OECD coun-
tries, underlining how the latter is generally preceded by the former (Brandt,
Burniaux, and Duval (2005)). Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) show that re-
forms in the goods market, reducing the ﬁrms’ rent, are also able to reduce
the workers’ incentive to appropriate such rents (by maintaining or increas-
ing their bargaining power), thus reducing in resistance to labor market
reforms. Koeniger and Vindigni (2003) argue that resistance to labor mar-
ket reforms (in particular with regard to employment protection) can be
reduced with liberalization policies if they are able to determine an increase
in job opportunities.
Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) show how product market regulation and
bargaining power of workers determine the size and distribution of rents and
the macroeconomic equilibrium. Among others, they ﬁnd that more compe-
tition, by decreasing rents, reduces the incentives for workers to appropriate
a part of these rents, facilitating labor market deregulation.
Following Ziesemer (2005), we extend the Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003)
model introducing frictions in the labor market. Moreover, we add to this
framework proportional income taxation and a more realistic setting of un-
employment beneﬁts. Using this model, we evaluate the potential room
that more competition can leave to ﬁscal policy, not only in terms of public
revenue (proportional taxation) but also of public expenditure (to ﬁnance
unemployment beneﬁts). In this framework, we show that more competi-
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tion in the goods market has a positive eﬀect on the Government budget
and on equilibrium unemployment. The public budget surplus can ﬁnance
either higher unemployment beneﬁts or tax reduction. In the former case,
the cost is represented by a lower increase in aggregate employment than in
the latter case.
The fact that a higher degree of competition is often associated with a
lower level of taxation seems to be conﬁrmed, at a very preliminary stage,
by the positive correlation between the OECD Product Market Regulation
Index2 and the tax wedge (see ﬁgure 1).
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the model,
while section 3 focus on equilibrium, comparative statics and some policy
considerations. Section 4 concludes.
2The indicators of the degree of competition in the goods market are calculated through
the OECD International Regulation Database, which contains all the information for cal-
culation of the Product Market Regulation (PMR) Index. This index was ﬁrst introduced
by the OECD in 1998 and subsequently updated in 2003. It is built considering a set
of norms and regulations that are potentially able to reduce the degree of competition in
particular sectors of the goods market, where the technology and the market conditions
can determine relevant beneﬁts for the whole economy.
52T h e m o d e l
2.1 Frictions in the labor market
Consider an economy with risk-neutral workers and ﬁrms which discount
future at constant rate r. The labor force is given and normalized to one.
Job-worker pairs are destroyed at the exogenous Poisson rate s.U n e m p l o y e d
workers and vacancies randomly match according to a Poisson process. If
the unemployed workers are the only job seekers and they search with ﬁxed
intensity of one unit each, and ﬁrms also search with ﬁxed intensity of one
unit for each job vacancy, the matching function gives h = h(u,v) where h
denotes the ﬂow of new matches, u is the unemployment rate and v is the
vacancy rate.
The matching function is assumed to be increasing in each argument
and to have constant return to scale overall.3 Furthermore, it is assumed to
be continuous and diﬀerentiable, with positive ﬁrst partial derivatives and
negative second derivatives.
By means of the properties of the matching function, we can deﬁne the
average rate at which vacancies meet potential partners by the following




with m0 (θ) < 0. θ is the ratio between vacancies and unemployed workers v
u
and can be interpreted as a convenient measure of labor market tightness.
Similarly,
h(u,v)
u is the probability for an unemployed worker to ﬁnd a
job. Simple algebra shows that:










The linear homogeneity of the matching function implies that θm(θ) is
increasing with θ. The dependence of the two transition probabilities, m(θ)
and θm(θ), on the relative number of traders implies the existence of a
trading externality (Diamond (1982)). Increasing vacancies cause congestion
for other ﬁrms, as increasing unemployed job searchers cause congestion for
other workers.
The measure of workers who enter unemployment is s(1 − u),w h i l et h e
measure of workers who leave unemployment is θm(θ)u. The dynamics of
unemployment is given by the diﬀerence between inﬂows and outﬂows: ˙ u =
s(1 − u) − θm(θ)u.T h i sd i ﬀerential equation deﬁn e sd y n a m i c sc o n v e r g i n g





showing that θ uniquely determines the unemployment rate. The properties
of the matching function ensure that the equation (3) is decreasing and
convex.
Taking into account that there is proportional income taxation, consider
now the “value” E of being an employed worker. This is deﬁned by the
following equation:
rE = w(1 − t)+s(U − E) (4)
An employed worker earns net wage w(1 − t), but loses his job with ﬂow
probability s. In the latter case, his utility plunges to that of an unemployed
worker. The value U of being an unemployed worker is given by:
7rU = b + ρw(1 − t)+θm(θ)(E − U) (5)
The unemployed worker earns ﬂow utility b, representing the value of
leisure, plus the unemployment beneﬁta saﬁxed proportion ρ (replacement
ratio) of the net wage w(1 − t). Then, with probability θm(θ),s h eﬁnds
employment.
2.2 Monopolistic competition in the goods market
We assume that households have love-of-variety preferences that can be ex-
















where yij is the household j’s consumption of good i and σ>1 is the
elasticity of substitution among n diﬀerentiated goods.
In continuos time, the problem of representative household j is to choose

















subject to the budget constraint ˙ Aj = rAj+I−
R n
0 piyijdi and Aj (0) = ¯ A ≥
0. δ is the subjective discount rate, Aj is the current wealth and pi is the
price of good i. I can be deﬁned as the average of the workers income when
employed or unemployed, weighted with the probability to be in the two
states: I =( 1− u)w(1 − t)+u[b + ρw(1 − t)].
The Hamiltonian current value of the intertemporal optimization prob-









































ij = λpi (8)
˙ λ − δλ = −rλ (9)
From equation (8) we can derive the following relationship for every









Equation (10) shows that the relative demand for goods is independent
of the income earned by employed or unemployed.




















That is, λ is the inverse of the price index p. Substituting the latter








where Y is the aggregate level of consumption and σ is the constant elasticity
of the demand function.
2.3 Proﬁt maximization
There is a large number of multiple-worker ﬁrms and no single ﬁrm is able
to aﬀect labor market tightness θ. Monopolistic competition in the goods
market implies that each ﬁrm produces only one of the n goods that appear
in the utility function. Technology is deﬁned by the production function yi =
li−f,w h e r eli is the number of workers involved in production of good i,a n d
the marginal labor productivity is assumed to be equal to 1. Futhermore,
this production function exhibits internal economy of scale because of the
ﬁxed cost component f.






p yi − wiyi − cvi
i
dt, subject to the law of motion of quantity
˙ yi = m(θ)vi−syi,w h e r epi (yi) is the inverse demand function faced by the
ﬁrm producing good i, wi is the real wage, and c is the cost of keeping a
vacancy open.
Solving the maximization programme, we get the standard price setting










where μ = 1
σ−1 is the mark-up on marginal costs, given by the state of
technology and the expected recruiting cost.
Finally, solving equation (13) for wi, and considering symmetric equilib-
10rium (
pi(yi)
p =1 ) we get the job creation condition as a relationship between








that represents the level of wage that ﬁrms are willing to pay. The worker
receives a wage lower than productivity because of both the ﬁnite value of
the demand elasticity of product ( 1
1+μ = σ−1





Since ﬁrms are multiple-workers, their outside option is to produce with one
worker less. Consider a ﬁrm with an open vacancy and li − 1 workers and
deﬁne its value by V (li − 1). Thus the stock price of this ﬁrm, V (li − 1)
must satisfy:
rV (li − 1) = −c + m(θ)[J (li) − V (li − 1)] (15)
With a ﬂow probability m(θ) the ﬁrm ﬁlls the vacancy and its value
jumps from V (li − 1) to J (li). Free entry implies that the value of a ﬁrm
with an open vacancy cannot exceed the value of an inactive ﬁrm, i.e. zero.
Thus, as long as some vacancies are held open at t, V (li − 1) = 0. Hence,





Equation (16) states that the value of a ﬁlled job must be equal to the
maintenance cost by the expected duration of a vacancy. Since a ﬁlled job
can be destroyed with probability s, the current value of the expected value
11of a ﬁlled job is (r + s)J (li)=
(r+s)c




When a searching ﬁrm and a searching worker meet, there is a potential
gain from trade. The wage contract is the instrument to split this surplus.
Firms and workers are assumed to bargain over the wage and conditions
under which separation occurs. Each party can force renegotiation whenever
it wishes, and in particular when new information arrives (or, equivalently,
the parties bargain continuously as long as they remain matched).
We assume that the sharing rule stems from the following Nash bargain-
ing problem:
w =a r gm a x[ E − U]
β [J (li) − V (li − 1)]
1−β (17)
The solution of this maximization programme yields the following shar-
ing rule:
E − U =
β (1 − t)
1 − β
[J (li) − V (li − 1)] (18)
which states that the worker obtains a fraction β of the total surplus pro-
duced by the economic activity.
Making use of the free entry condition and of equations (4), (5) and




r+s ,w eg e t :
w =
(1 − β)b
(1 − t)[1− (1 − β)ρ]
+
β







This condition is known as the wage equation, and it is a positively sloped
relationship between the wage and the labor market tightness. Note that,
since cv is the total recruiting cost in the economy, cθ is the recruiting cost
per unemployed worker. When θ is high (tight labor market) the expected
12recruiting cost faced by ﬁrms is high, while, conversely, the cost for workers
to wait for the next job oﬀer is low. This implies that workers can bargain
for better wages. Monopoly power in the goods market reduces the level of
bargained wage. Moreover, the wage bargained by the workers increases in
the value of their outside option, b, in the worker’s bargaining power β,i n
the level of productivity and in the cost of recruiting unemployed workers c.
2.5 Government budget constraint
No public deﬁcits are allowed, hence the Government faces the following
budget constraint:
t[(1 − u)w + uρw]=uρw (20)
Looking at equation (20), on the left side we put the public revenue,
on the right public expenditure. Public revenues come from taxation t on
gross wage bulk (1 − u)w and on unemployment beneﬁt uρw, while public
expenditure is the unemployment beneﬁt ρw paid to unemployed workers u.
Making use of the equation (3) and taking into account that 1 − u =
θm(θ)





As θm(θ) is an increasing function of θ, equation (21) states a decreasing
relationship between tax rate t and labor market tightness (the PBcurve in
ﬁgure 2), since rising θ brings the unemployment rate down; as a consequence
we have a reduction of expenditure for unemployment beneﬁts and, given t,
an increase of the public revenue. Hence, the public budget balance requires
al o w e rl e v e lo ft.
133R e s u l t s
In this Section, we characterize the macroeconomic equilibrium and analyze
the eﬀects and interactions of product market regulation and labor market
intervention. In particular, we begin by considering a reduction in mark-
up μ as the ﬁnal result of deregulation policies.4 We will then assess the
eﬀect of an increase in the replacement ratio ρ. Finally, in the Discussion
we will propose more general policy considerations in the light of previous
comparative statics exercises.
3.1 Equilibrium
The steady state equilibrium is deﬁned as a vector (w,θ,u,t) that solves the
system of equations (14), (19), (3) and (21).









(1 − t)[1− (1 − β)ρ]
+
β







which gives the pairs (t,θ) such that the labor market is in equilibrium.
Equation (22) states a decreasing relationship between tax rate t and labor
market tightness θ (the JW curve in ﬁgure 2). To see this, let us start from
an initial situation where the labor market is in equilibrium for a given value
4Since in our model, the mark-up depends only on demand elasticity σ (i.e. a preference
parameter), this procedure could be questionable. However, our results could also be
obtained introducing entry costs, assuming demand elasticity as an increasing function of
the number of ﬁrms (i.e. in a Hotelling fashion) and making comparative statics directly
on entry costs. In the latter case, the variation of the mark-up is obtained indirectly from
the variation of the entry costs, which aﬀect the equilibrium number of ﬁrms and, as a







of the tax rate t.H i g h e rt increases the worker’s option value (by reduction
of the net wage) leading ﬁrms to reduce the number of vacancies and, in this
way, diminishing the equilibrium value of θ.
Equation (21) and (22) are a self contained block that gives the pairs
(t,θ) such that the labor market is in equilibrium and the Government bud-
get is in balance (see ﬁgure 2).5 Then, by equations (3) we can derive the
equilibrium value of the unemployment rate u. Finally, substituting the
equilibrium value of θ either into the job creation condition (14) or into the
wage equation (19), we get the equilibrium value of the gross wage.
To close the model, we need to determine the equilibrium size of the ﬁrm
and the number of active ﬁrms.
T od ot h i s ,w eh a v et oi m p o s et h ez e r op r o ﬁt condition. Given the
instantaneous proﬁt
pi(yi)
p yi −wiyi −cvi in symmetric equilibrium, equating
it to zero and using the production function yi = li − f we get:
5In principle, the PB curve could be steeper or ﬂatter than the JW curve. We focus
on the latter situation since it guarantees a stable equilibrium.
15y − w(f + y) − cv =0 (23)
Let us consider the law of motion of the ﬁrm’s output given by ˙ y =





Substituting the latter equation into zero proﬁt condition (23) and solv-
ing by y we obtain the equilibrium ﬁrm size:
y =
f [m(θ)w∗ + sc]
(1 − w∗)m(θ) − sc
(25)
where w∗ is the equilibrium wage.
We can now determine the equilibrium number of active ﬁrms in sym-
metric equilibrium. Total labor requirement is nl,w h e r en is the number of





Making use of equation (3), the production function and equation (25),
we obtain that the ﬁrms’ equilibrium number n must satisfy the following
condition:
n =
θ[(1 − w∗)m(θ) − sc]
f (2 − w∗)[s + θm(θ)]
(27)
3.2 Comparative statics
In this Section we perform some comparative statics analysis, in order to










Let us consider the eﬀect of a decrease in the mark-up μ.L o o k i n g a t
ﬁgure 3, we see that the JW curve moves up to the right. Given t,w e
have that both the wage that ﬁrms are willing to pay (via the job creation
condition) and the wage required by the workers (via the wage equation)
increase; however, the latter increase is proportionally lower than the former.
As a consequence, ﬁrms will open a higher number of vacancies, which in
turn implies higher θ and lower unemployment rate u.I n t e r m s o f ﬁgure
3, this implies a shift from equilibrium A to B, where the labor market is
in equilibrium (point B is on the JW curve) but the public budget is in
surplus (because of the lower level of unemployment). Given ρ, lower tax
rate t is required in order to balance the Government budget. The tax rate
reduction produces a feedback on the bargained wage because the workers
will perceive a higher net wage and will claim a lower gross wage, with a
further positive eﬀect on θ (given the wage oﬀered by the ﬁrm). The ﬁnal
result of this process will be a higher equilibrium value of θ and a lower
equilibrium value of t (point C in ﬁgure 3).
Consider an increase in the replacement ratio ρ,a s s u m i n ga ss t a r t i n g
17point the equilibrium C in ﬁgure 3. This implies a shift down to the left
of the JW curve (from JW0 to JW) and up to the right of the PB curve
(from PB to PB0). The former eﬀect stems from the fact that, given t,
an increase in ρ enhances the option value of the worker who will claim a
higher gross wage. Consequently, given the negative eﬀect on proﬁt, the
ﬁrms reduce vacancies. This leads to a higher level of wage w and a lower
l e v e lo ft i g h t n e s sθ. The shift of the PB curve is due to the fact that, given
θ,a ni n c r e a s ei nρ requires a higher tax rate t in order to balance the public
budget. A corresponding process with respect to the one discussed above
with regard to a reduction in μ, leads to a lower equilibrium value of θ and a
higher equilibrium tax rate t.L o o k i n ga tﬁgure 3, we move from equilibrium
C to equilibrium D.
3.3 Discussion
Our framework suggests interesting implications for policy. Looking at the
experience of some European countries (especially Italy and Spain), the late
Nineties were the years of increasing labor market ﬂexibility, with the intro-
duction of atypical labor contracts and change in employment relationships.
Labor market ﬂexibility brings about social costs related to the higher
turnover. In the particular case of Italy this has raised a policy debate on the
possibility of introducing some support for unemployed workers, in a country
where the replacement ratio is low when compared with the other OECD
countries. The results of our model show that an increase in the replacement
ratio can be conveniently joined with liberalization policies able to increase
competition in goods markets sector.
Let us sketching this argument using our diagram. Suppose that subse-











reached equilibrium A in ﬁgure 4. Our ﬁnding is that if we increased the
replacement ratio (i.e. per-capita unemployment beneﬁts) letting the tax
rate adjust freely, we would get equilibrium B, which is characterized by
higher unemployment and tax rate. However, if combining the increase in
unemployment beneﬁts with liberalization policies, we could possibly reach
equilibrium C, with the same equilibrium unemployment rate as in equilib-
rium A a n dw i t hat a xr a t es l i g h t l yh i g h e r . A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,w ec o u l dr e a c h
equilibrium D with lower unemployment rate and keeping the tax rate con-
stant.
4C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we have analyzed the policy implications in a model with
frictions in the labor market and monopolistic competition in the goods
market, when the Government has a balanced budget constraint. We have
made comparative statics analyzing the eﬀects on equilibrium of a change in
the degree of product market competition and a change in the replacement
ratio.
19It is found that: a) more competition in the goods market leads to a
lower equilibrium unemployment and, given the replacement ratio, a lower
tax rate; b) higher unemployment beneﬁts make the labor market tighter
with a negative eﬀect on equilibrium unemployment and require a higher
tax rate in order to balance the public budget; c) wrapping up results a and
b, increasing competition in the goods market has a positive eﬀect on the
Government budget and on equilibrium unemployment; the public budget
surplus can ﬁnance either higher unemployment beneﬁts or tax reduction.
In the former case, the cost is represented by a lower increase in aggregate
employment than in the latter case.
We do not tackle some interesting issues that could be an object for
future research. It would be interesting to evaluate the redistributive eﬀects
deriving from comparative static analysis. The issue could be treated in two
respects: the redistributive eﬀects between labor and entrepreneurs’ income
and, introducing heterogeneity, the redistributive eﬀects among diﬀerent
types of agents. Furthermore, modelling progressive taxation could be able
to enrich the model.
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